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I’m going to talk about warring societies and the role of academics in them. I’m trying 
to describe a logic of colonial settler states, which have always conceived themselves to 
be besieged by uncivilised others and which structure themselves defensively and 
legitimise these structures in the sense that they have to protect themselves from the 
uncivilised others surrounding them. 
 
Now to my mind, we in the west, in a variety of ways, have been structuring ourselves 
as warring societies for a very long time. And this is so well before 9/11. It is important 
to remind ourselves of this because the question is not whether there is a real threat, like 
9/11, or no real threat. This process of structuring ourselves as a warring society starts 
with the idea that we are surrounded by uncivilised others, that they’re out to get us, that 
refugees from the outside are climbing in; and that also, mothers on the dole are getting 
us from the inside, that the unemployed are gnawing at our very being. All of these 
ideas are about the internal and external threats that shape the way we increasingly 
legitimise society around this notion of how we live and survive such threats. And it is 
this which has to my mind globalised colonial settler culture.  
 
I think this is especially so when you compare certain cultural forms and cultural and 
political practices in Israel and the United States. I think there have been a lot of anti-
Semitic modes of explaining this, saying Jews are controlling American politics and this 
is why you see Americans acting in this way or that way. But I think it has nothing to do 
with who’s controlling anything! It’s just a structural correspondence between two 
modalities of being generated by two societies structured along similar warring 
principles. 
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In our society even the language of war has become very common: history wars, 
cultural wars. We seem to be having endless wars. Someone came up with “an Analogy 
war” the other day. Here we were caught up in “an Analogy war” and no one noticed. 
But we can’t be blamed given how many wars we are surrounded with at the moment. 
On the positive side, most of us are surviving well, so far, in spite of them. 
 
Now, I’m not simply interested in describing warring society. I’m also interested in 
describing how academics and particularly intellectuals work and write in these 
conditions. Of course, this is for me a personal question. Because that’s what I am, for 
better or worse. I am an academic, an intellectual and I’m trying to write. And so what 
kind of writing can I engage in, in such warring conditions?  
 
The first thing that is important to remember about warring societies is that they 
emphasise the logic of friends and enemies. I say emphasise because this logic is always 
present in society. It is the very logic of politics. Politicians don’t have the luxury of 
endlessly questioning where they are standing. Otherwise they’ll be totally silly and 
inefficient as politicians. Politics has the logic of friends and enemies because in politics 
you have to take positions. At one point or another, you have to stop thinking critically 
and reflexively and say, “this is where I stand. And it is from this standpoint that I have 
to act. If you’re with me you’re my friend if you are not you are my enemy”. 
Intellectuals, on the other hand, can afford to be quite inefficient and indeed, it is part of 
their ethos. It is ethical for intellectuals to be continuously questioning where they are 
standing. We can paradoxically say that being practically/politically inefficient, 
constantly questioning where one has ended up, is part of being an efficient intellectual. 
And therefore intellectuals are not really position takers, by their very nature. There is a 
continuous tension between politicians and intellectuals I think. Recently, I said to a 
political activist friend that I am having second thoughts about the efficiency of the call 
for the academic boycott of Israel even though it was a good strategy when it was 
initially introduced. Her response was: “how could you even think that this would be 
the case?”. I replied that she was a political activist and so she has to stop herself from 
thinking to maintain her activism. I on the other hand there is nothing that I would stop 
myself from thinking. I thought that this pretty much captured the difference between us 
even though we shared a lot in common. 
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Now, what’s interesting, I think and this what I started by saying, is that this tension 
between friends/enemies, position taking/acting, intellectual/politician starts collapsing 
in warring societies, because warring societies cannot afford eternal questioning. You 
know, we have heard of it in the US when Dick Cheney called academics the weak link 
in the war on terror. In his view, the weak link means, “you’re thinking too much. 
Enough! We have to fight here!” 
 
Now, very importantly, I think, these two tendencies I’ve been talking about are simply 
professionalisation of two tendencies which exist within every citizen. That is, every 
citizen has one part of them which is about position-taking and one part of them which 
is about questioning. And warring societies also force that part of the citizen which is 
questioning to stop existing and for the position-taking, the part that thinks 
friends/enemies, to take over and become much more dominant in the making of the 
citizen. 
 
Susan Sontag, I think, put it very nicely when she said that today, in the United States, 
people are not required to be citizens, they are required to be conscripts. And this logic 
of conscription is precisely what captures this idea that the citizen has to think in terms 
of friends or enemy, are you with us or not with us? You’re for us or you’re against us. 
 
Warring societies, again, like colonial settler societies cannot tolerate the thought of 
commonness with the other. In fact, they are not very xenophobic in the sense that they 
are not scared of the difference of the other. They love the other to be different. They 
love their others to be different and they love their difference. They are not scared of 
their difference from the others, they’re scared of their sameness with the others! That’s 
why in Against Paranoid Nationalism I call this ‘homeophobia’ (the fear of sameness) 
not xeno-phobia. I don’t want to be put in a position where I’m looking at the other and 
saying, “she’s a human being like me” or “he’s a human being like me”, that will 
disrupt my friends-enemy logic and I don’t want to face it. And so culturally different is 
very good! Again, notice the slogans, “they hate us because they hate us”. Here, as in 
the discourse of the refugee, there is no sign of envy. The absence of the discourse of 
envy is very important because usually we can actually insult someone by telling him he 
is envious of us. But to say to someone, “you’re envious,” is not a good insult because 
the envious person is someone who desires what I desire. So if you say, they desire 
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what I desire, you’re saying they are human beings like us. But in a truly warring logic 
not even this basic sameness with the enemy should be allowed. They don’t hate us 
because they envy us, they hate us because they hate us. Full stop. Let’s not try and find 
any common ground here. 
 
The sole aim of the “other” is to undermine me, undermine my existence and my sole 
aim is to find ways of undermining him or her, in order not to let them undermine my 
own existence. That is the logic of war. This is why the warring society now legitimises 
slowly and clearly all sorts of practices which are considered within non-warring, 
normal situations as unethical and illegitimate. Torture, lying, manipulation -- all of 
these are undemocratic, unethical practices which in normal times we consider don’t 
belong to our society. Suddenly our society starts saying, “That’s okay, we can do this”. 
Recently Georgio Agamben, following Schmidt, argued: “It’s a state of exception”. Not 
only is it a state of exception but it is a wonderful conception, it is a permanent state of 
exception. A state of exception allows a citizen to legitimise to themselves, and to each 
other, being undemocratic and unethical, while maintaining the belief in their ethical 
selves by continuously moving between the two states: in moment A I am a nice 
democratic ethical person, in moment B I am a warrior who has to kill but soon after I 
can return to moment A and be myself. Like the soldier, the citizen conscript has to say: 
“it’s true that I am killing the enemy but I am not a killer. Now that I am out of my 
warring state of exception I can go back to being a good non-killer”. But once this logic 
creeps in and becomes a permanent state of exception the citizen stops fluctuating 
between a normal, democratic, ethical state and a warring non-ethical state. Instead the 
citizen/warrior splits himself or herself into two. Between a contingent citizen and an 
essential citizen and the contingent citizen is saying basically: “I have to do what I have 
to do. But even though I have to do what I have to do, my essence is still good. Even 
though I support torture, I don’t really support torture. I have to support torture but 
really deep down I don’t support it”. 
 
So, the citizen can actually manage to continuously support unethical practices while 
still maintaining the belief in their ultimate, essential ethical selves. This is again a 
strong similarity between warring societies and colonial settler societies. Colonial 
settler societies allow massive torture and repression to happen around them and the 
colonising people still don’t see it. They say “we do it because we’re really superior 
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ethical human beings. That’s why we have to carry out torture etcetera otherwise we 
don’t do it!” 
 
So, slowly and surely in practice warring societies vacate their democracies. Their 
democracies become what I’d like to call with a little Lacanian bent, “phallic” 
democracies. Phallic democracies, you see, are democracies for others as opposed to the 
democracies for ourselves. They are democracies for show, rather than democracies to 
live in. What is important is not how you live your democracy but the fact that you have 
your democracy. This is where the phallic logic creeps in. Once you claim to have a 
democracy you enter the domain of comparative democracy. My democracy is bigger 
than your democracy. In fact, not only my democracy can be bigger than your 
democracy, my democracy can be the only thing there is. You probably have no 
democracy at all! You see this in the way the conflict is conducted with the Israelis 
versus the Palestinians. We have democracy, say the Israelis. We have democracy. You 
don’t have democracy. The white South Africans did it to the black South Africans. We 
do it to all sorts of people. This projective phallic democracy comes hand in hand with 
the undermining and gutting of lived democracy. 
 
Freedom of speech also becomes vacuous. Any content is emptied out. This Syrian 
friend I was talking to when I was in Lebanon last year said to me that comparatively 
Lebanon has a lot more freedom of speech than Syria, in the sense that you can write 
articles damning the government without going to jail. He said to me, “look, every time 
I open my mouth in Syria, they put me in jail. Here I say whatever I like and they say to 
me, we don’t give a damn, say whatever you like! Now, I’m not sure whether I prefer 
freedom of speech or being put in jail, you know, because in Syria someone there is 
taking seriously what I’m saying whereas here in Lebanon, freedom of speech means 
they don’t give a damn what I’m saying!” What’s interesting then about this is that 
freedom of speech can be undermined in two ways. You can vacate it as a freedom and 
undervalue freedom, but you can have freedom of speech and undervalue speech and 
still have freedom of undervalued speech. Speech becomes like breathing: absolutely 
necessary but pretty meaningless: both indispensable and both with zero political effect. 
We have the freedom of breathing and we have the freedom of speech. Fantastic! 
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So, both colonial settler societies and warring societies undermine speech, subvert 
speech, subvert the weight of speech by subverting it’s impact. There is an ethical 
content to speech which is vacated also out of that speech. We see it with right wing 
warriors turning terms which had very high ethical content once upon a time, terms like 
sexism, racism. Now, you throw sexism or racism at people and they say, Reverse!  
Reverse sexism. Reverse racism! But the word has no longer any impact in making 
people stop to think twice about the unethical effect of what they are doing. 
 
How can academics, writers, intellectuals work in conditions such as warring societies? 
It is a very difficult issue because warring societies by suspending self-criticism for the 
sake of politics and by encouraging empty vacuous speech, they encourage among 
intellectuals the production of repetitive and confirmationist discourse. I’ve witnessed 
this kind of discourse a lot during the war in Lebanon. It is a mode of writing and 
speaking in a situation where you know that your audience has given up on trying to 
learn. In fact they think they know everything there is to know and they listen to you 
simply to judge whether you know as much as they do. You go and have a political 
conversation in a café in Ramallah or Tel Aviv and you’ll immediately know what I 
mean. There is no point you saying I am an “expert” or a “researcher” who has 
discovered all these interesting things that no one knows about. People will openly and 
contemptuously laugh at you if you say anything other than what fits their 
understanding of the conflict.  And there is no room to shake their firm belief in the 
absolute correctness of their knowledge. There is a total narcissism and belief in the self 
as a knowledgeable person and no knowledge from the outside should come to disturb 
or disrupt this sense of intellectual omnipotence. It is like the wonderful moment when 
Phillip Ruddock told this guy from a refugee advocacy organisation which the 
government was financing, “We’re paying you to know better”. Note the wonderful 
conception of the production of knowledge that is behind a statement like “we’re paying 
you to know better”. It means that Ruddock already knows what is better and what is 
not better. So, why he is paying the guy in the first place, we don’t know. But he pays 
those people to produce knowledge for him and then he judges whether their knowledge 
is good which means he already has an absolute knowledge of the knowledge he was 
seeking! This is what I mean by warriors looking for repetitive and comfirmationist 
knowledge. They do not respect intellectuals who tells them new things but those who 
simply repeat and confirm what they already know. They are labelled as “good” and  
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even “brilliant” simply according to how well they repeat and confirm one’s already 
absolute knowledge. During the Lebanese civil war many Christian and Muslim 
intellectuals were celebrated by their respective populations for what was declared 
“scientific” work which interestingly did not demonstrate anything new. It simply 
produced a “social scientific” discourse with pseudo research and statistics and 
historical data which totally proved what people already knew. Such intellectuals were 
simply adored… we can see more than a shade of this confirmationist discourse in the 
work of Keith Windshuttle who has brilliantly and scientifically discovered what the 
conservatives already had a clear gut feeling to be the truth about the history of 
Australia’s colonisation. 
 
The warriors also claim a monopoly over reality. They claim that reality is on their side. 
Right-wing warrior discourse in Australia, as much as in colonial settler society, claims 
a privileged access to reality. Anyone who is not walking along with them suffers from 
delusions. It is easy to see as one reads Miranda Devine and others. “Get real!”  They 
say, “Stop being in the clouds! Hey, what do you think? Come on, why don’t you taste 
reality as it is.” There’s a claim that they’ve got it and everybody else is wafting 
through the universe. And it’s very interesting because this is not a delusion. In fact, 
actuality is on their side. A very good example of this realism is the phrase, “Well, 
that’s history, okay? It’s a bit like Benny Morris also, looking at what has happened in 
Palestine, saying, “Well, that’s it, you know. It happens, that’s history!”…. And there is 
an element which is like this in warring societies, where it’s like, “Come on, you know, 
what’s past is past, let’s face reality as it is instead of moralising about it!” 
 
Here, we need to differentiate along the Aristotelian lines, revived by Agamben, and 
before that by Deleuze, between actuality and potentiality (or virtuality). Reality is not 
made up just of reality. Reality is what is actual, but it is also what is possible. What 
can be, what ought to be, even what is morally possible. And right-wing warring forces 
try to stop people from thinking about what is possible, what can be, or what ought to 
be. They appear to be on the side of reality because what is, is on their side and they 
like people to limit their thoughts to what is. And so the utopian function of intellectuals 
gets undermined. I think this utopian function of reaching out to what can be, to what 
ought to be, against what is, is a very important intellectual function today, even if in a 
warrior society it gets incredibly limited. 
